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Physician Assistant as Abortion Provider:
Lessons from Vermont, New York, and
Montana
by
JENNIFER TEMPLETON SCHIRMER*
Introduction
The United States is suffering from a shortage of physicians willing
to provide abortions.' According to a 1992 study, 84% of all counties
had no abortion provider and 94% of rural counties had no abortion
provider.' Some states have only one doctor who performs abortions for
the entire state.3 Moreover, the problem of access has worsened since
these studies were conducted.4  Many providers have retired or
* J.D. Candidate, Hastings College of the Law, 1998; B.A. University of California,
Berkeley, 1991. I wish to thank Precilla Smith for her suggestions and assistance in guiding my
research during the initial stages of this Note and Claudia Center and Ray Weschler for their
insights and criticisms of the earlier drafts of this Note. Also, I would like to thank my family
and friends for their love and support.
1. See Sandra G. Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions? Shortage of
Trained Providers of the Procedure Leads to a Controversial Proposal, WASH. POST, Feb. 15,
1994, Health Tab at 7 [hereinafter Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions.];
Sandra G. Boodman, The Dearth of Abortion Doctors: Stigma, Low Pay and Lack of Personal
Commitment Erode Ranks, WASH. POST, Apr. 20, 1993, Health Tab at 7 [hereinafter
Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors].
2. See Stanley K. Henshaw & Jennifer Van Vort, Abortion Services in the United States,
1991 and 1992, 26 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 100 (1994).
3. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7; see also Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7. Doctor
David Gunn, a physician who was shot and killed by pro-life activist Michael Griffin, used to
travel between three states (Alabama, Georgia, and Florida) in order to provide women with
safe and accessible abortion services. See Carol J. Castaneda, Victim Harassed for Years, USA
TODAY, Mar. 12, 1993, at 3A, Death by an Extremist's Gun: Abortion Clinics and Their Staffs
Are So Tragically Vulnerable, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, at B6 [hereinafter Death by an
Extremist's Gun].
4. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
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discontinued providing abortions, and new providers have not stepped
forward to replace them.'
In 1990, the National Abortion Federation and the American College
of Obstetrics and Gynecology convened a national symposium to address
the shortage of abortion providers.' The Symposium recommended
"[e]ncouraging physicians and clinics to train and integrate midlevel
clinicians into abortion service delivery." 7 A "midlevel clinician," also
referred to as a "midlevel practitioner" or "midlevel provider," is a
medically licensed nonphysician, generally a nurse practitioner, physician
assistant, or certified nurse midwife.' Midlevel providers can be more
accessible and are generally less expensive than physicians.9 Often they
are able to spend more time with a patient, listening and answering
questions and providing health education.'0
Midlevel providers are becoming more and more utilized, especially
in managed care systems." Many Health Maintenance Organizations
(HMOs), private offices, and family planning clinics depend on nurse
practitioners, certified nurse midwives, and physician assistants to
provide the bulk of services once provided by physicians. 2 At some
women's health clinics, physician assistants and nurse practitioners
provide the majority, if not all, of the clinics' obstetric and gynecological
care, except for abortions."
The use of midlevel providers in the abortion context would result in
a more efficient provision of health care,' 4 increase the provider pool
from which patients could choose an abortion provider," and decrease
the cost of the procedure.16 However, in most states, whether a midlevel
5. See Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7.
6. See NATIONAL ABORTION FEDERATION & AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND
GYNECOLOGY, WHO WILL PROVIDE ABORTIONS? ENSURING THE AVAILABILITY OF
QUALIFIED PRACTITIONERS: RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM 24-25
(1990) [hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM].
7. Id. at 24.
8. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, THE NEW OUR BODIES OURSELVES: A
BOOK BY AND FOR WOMEN 666 (1992).
9. See id.
10. See id.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 661, 671-75.
13. Based on this author's experience as Prenatal Services Coordinator and High Risk
Teen Counselor at Planned Parenthood Mar Monte's East San Jose Clinic (1993-95).
14. See infra Part III.C.
15. See infra Part III.A.
16. See infra Part III.D.
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clinician may legally provide abortions is uncertain, if not outright
prohibited.'
7
This Note questions the assumptions in the abortion context that
physician care is the only care and that excluding licensed midlevel
providers from performing low risk, first trimester abortions is best for
the patient. Although this Note outlines state approaches to legalizing
abortion services provided by midlevel practitioners, it primarily focuses
on physician assistants since the statutes regulating physician assistants
are less restrictive than those regulating the other two professions.'" Part
I briefly reviews the history of laws proscribing abortions performed by
nonphysicians. Part II describes the political debate surrounding the
provision of medical services by midlevel providers and demonstrates
that there are no medical justifications for continuing to exclude midlevel
providers from providing abortion services. Part III examines the
barriers confronting women seeking legal abortions, focusing on the
scarcity of abortion providers. Part IV looks at the abortion and
physician assistant laws in Vermont, New York, and Montana in order to
illustrate three statutory approaches to legalizing abortions by physician
assistants. Finally, Part V offers an alternative approach using state
constitutions as a method for ensuring the continued protection of a
woman's right to privacy in the abortion context.
I. History of Abortion Laws and the
"Physician-Only" Provision
A. History of Abortion Legislation: 1848-1900
Prior to the late nineteenth century, first and second trimester
abortions were legal. 9  Abortion before "quickening " ' was not
17. See Donna Lieberman & Anita Lalwani, Physician-Only and Physician Assistant
Statutes: A Case of Perceived but Unfounded Conflict, 49 J. AM. MED. WOMEN'S ASS'N 146,
146-49 (1994).
18. See id. at 146. According to the National Abortion Federation and the medical
associations for certified nurse midwives and nurse practitioners, physician assistants, certified
nurse midwives and nurse practitioners are all medically competent to perform first trimester
abortions. Telephone Interview with Susan Dudley, Access Initiative Director, National
Abortion Federation, Washington D.C. (Nov. 22, 1996); see also Lieberman & Lalwani, supra
note 17, at 146. However, because of the differing regulations and regulating bodies for the
three medical professions and the varying laws among the several states, it has been easier and
may continue to be easier for physician assistants to begin performing abortions. Telephone
Interview with Susan Dudley, supra.
19. JAMES MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA 3-6 (1978).
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considered morally wrong by the general public any more than it would
have been to prevent conception in the first place.21 Even the Christian
religion did not consider abortion before quickening to be murder or
claim that the fetus was a person. Those who opposed abortion on
moral grounds before the late nineteenth century opposed it because it
involved sex, not because of the potential life of the fetus.23 A nineteenth
century physician described the attitude of his female patients toward
abortion: "[Their idea generally was that the foetus is not alive, but
only has, one might say, a capacity for living, and hence that, to destroy
it was not homicide, and hardly more criminal than to prevent
conception."24  Abortion was not legally restricted until the third
trimester, after "quickening;" but even this was rarely enforced.?
5
In addition to the absence of legal restrictions on abortions, the
medical establishment itself did not regulate the practice of abortion.'
There was no formal structure to the medical profession. 27 Unlike the
medical profession of today, there were no licensing, training or
education requirements. 8 Medical services were provided by a variety of
physician and nonphysician sources.2 9  Home herbal remedies,
abortifacient drugs, hot baths, douching, strenuous exercise, and even
tooth-pulling were used to induce abortion, often with the assistance of
midwives and other nonphysician healers. 3' Newspaper ads, home
medical guides, health manuals, and even religious texts provided
information and treatments for bringing on a late period and fixing other
"menstrual irregularities." 31
20. "Quickening... was the period in pregnancy when a woman felt fetal
movement .... [Ilit generally occurs between the fourth and the sixth month of pregnancy."
KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD 14 (1984).
21. See id., at 11-20; MOHR, supra note 19, at 10.
22. See LUKER, supra note 20, at 11.
23. See id.
24. Id. at 22.
25. The statutes which proscribed abortion after "quickening" were virtually ineffective
since quickening was difficult to prove with the medical technology available at the time. See
id. at 14-15; see also Bangs v. Commonwealth, 9 Mass. (1 Tyng) 386, 388 (1812) (overturning
conviction of defendant and holding that prosecution must allege and prove quickening had
occurred).
26. See LUKER, supra note 20, at 18-26.
27. See id.
28. See id.
29. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 4-12.
30. See id., at 8-11; LUKER, supra note 20, at 18-20.
31. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 8-11.
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B. The Movement to Criminalize Abortion
In the late nineteenth century, the public's opinion of abortion began
to change. This change has been attributed primarily to the movement by
physicians and the American Medical Association (AMA) to criminalize
abortion.32  Physicians sought standardized medical licensing and
regulations in order to improve the quality of medicine and to prevent
untrained, uneducated nonphysicians from practicing medicine.33
However, not all of the AMA's motivations were so benign. There
are various theories as to why the AMA led the anti-abortion movement:
to restrict competition with traditional healers; to "better" the profession;
to prevent de-population among the middle to upper classes; 34 and to
prohibit a procedure physicians believed to be dangerous 35 and morally
wrong.
36
The weight of evidence and personal accounts of the abortion
experience in the late nineteenth century supported the AMA's position
that prohibiting the practice of abortion would best protect maternal
health. Abortion in the nineteenth century was not as safe as it is today.37
There was a high risk of hemorrhage and infection, possibly resulting in
32. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 141 (1973); LUKER, supra note 20, at 16-39; MOHR,
supra note 19, at 20-44.
33. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 26-28
(1989); see also Diane Curtis, Note, Doctored Rights: Menstnual Extraction, Self-Help
Gynecological Care, and the Law, 20 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 427, 443 (1994)
("Women-as patients, doctors, and lay healers-were disproportionately targeted by these
exclusionary practices. This systematic elimination of women from leadership roles in the
medical profession is well documented.").
34. In 1905, Theodore Roosevelt stated, "'Race purity must be maintained, we must have
more native white births.'" BOSTON WOMEN's HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 371
(quoting Theodore Roosevelt). When the anti-abortion movement was gaining momentum,
there was an increase in immigration and immigrant births and an increase in abortions by white
middle class women. In 1850, approximately 3-4% of all pregnancies ended in abortion. By
1870, the number of abortions had increased to 14-16% of all pregnancies. This increase in
abortions was attributed to an increase in the use of abortion by white middle class women. See
HALL, supra note 33, at 44. This paper will not explore eugenics as a motivation behind the
movement to criminalize abortion. For further insight into eugenics and the fear of
depopulation, see BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 371. The authors
of THE NEW OUR BODIES OURSELVES suggest that the anti-abortion movement was also a
backlash against feminism, women's rights, and the suffrage movement. Id.
35. See LUKER, supra note 20, at 20 (Physicians felt abortion was medically dangerous
and morally wrong.); Roe, 410 U.S. at 149 (Abortion was dangerous when anti-abortion
statutes were created in the late 1800s and is now as safe as childbirth.). But see MOHR, supra
note 19, at 3-18 (claiming that abortion in the beginning of the nineteenth century was
considered safe by medical standards of the day).
36. See LUKER, supra note 20, at 20, 26-28.
37. See id. at 30.
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sterility or even death. 8 Furthermore, since abortion and medical care in
general were not regulated, the procedure could be performed by anyone
from an herbalist healer39 to a dentist.4°
From the perspective of a regular physician, prohibiting abortions,
which were performed primarily by nonphysicians, served both to restrict
a possibly dangerous procedure and also to eliminate the competition
from nonphysicians.41 By 1900, every state prohibited abortion except in
cases where it was necessary to save the life of the mother.42
C. Roe v. Wade and the Legalization of Abortion
In 1973, the Supreme Court held that laws proscribing abortion were
unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade.43 The Court explained that, because of
advances in technology and safety, states' interest in maternal health had
disappeared. 44 When the statutes were first enacted over a century ago,
the mortality rate from abortion was high.45 In 1973, with medical
advancement, the abortion mortality rate was as low or lower than
childbirth.46
Ironically, the AMA, which lobbied successfully to prohibit
abortions in the nineteenth century, lobbied for the removal of these laws
in the twentieth century.47 Justice Blackmun, author of Roe v. Wade and
praised by many in the pro-choice movement for his stance on abortion,
38. See HALL, supra note 33, at 163; see also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 132 Mass. 261,
261 (1882) (defendant was convicted of attempting to procure abortion after woman died from
procedure); People v. McGonegal, 136 N.Y. 62, 62 (1892) (defendant was charged with
manslaughter because woman died as a result of abortion procedure).
39. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 11.
40. See Mills v. Commonwealth, 13 Pa. 631, 632 (1850) (dentist charged with inducing
an abortion).
41. See MOHR, supra note 19, at 20-44.
42. See LUKER, supra note 20, at 15.
43. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164. In 1973, Jane Roe, an unmarried pregnant woman, brought a
suit challenging Texas' abortion law which made the act of abortion criminal except to save the
life of the mother. Roe, 410 U.S. at 113. In Roe, the Supreme Court held that the right of
privacy includes a woman's right to terminate her pregnancy and that state laws which restrict
this right are subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 154-55. Since that time, the right to abortion has
eroded in the courts and the level of scrutiny has dropped to preclude only those regulations
which place an "undue burden" on a woman's right to choose abortion. See Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
44. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 149.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See David M. Smolin, The Jurisprudence of Privacy in a Splintered Supreme Court,
75 MARQ. L. REV. 975, 1017 (1992).
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is also highly criticized for his deference to physicians. 48  In Roe, the
Court recognized a woman's right to have an abortion by "licensed
physicians, "49 and held that a state may proscribe abortions performed by
people who are not "licensed physicians." 5
D. Roe: A Woman's Right to an Abortion or a Physician's Right to
Perform an Abortion?
Roe v. Wade is generally understood to guarantee a woman's right to
procure an abortion. In reality, Roe does not stand for a woman's right
to have an abortion but for a physician's right to perform an abortion.
How a woman procures an abortion remains heavily restricted.
Two years after Roe, in Connecticut v. Menillo,51 the Court held that
states may prohibit abortions by nonphysicians 2 The Court explained
that the criminal statutes against abortion were only unconstitutional as
applied to physician-induced abortions, not abortions induced by
nonphysicians.53
In Menillo, criminal charges were brought against a nonphysician
with no medical training.54 The Court held that a state may proscribe
abortions by nonphysicians in order to promote the state's interest in
maternal health.5' The Court explained that the Roe opinion recognized a
woman's right to have an abortion "'performed by a competent, licensed
physician, under safe, clinical conditions.' ,56 The Court stated:
Moreover, the rationale of our decision supports continued
enforceability of criminal abortion statutcs against
nonphysicians. Roe teaches that a State cannot restrict a
decision by a woman, with the advice of her physician, to
terminate her pregnancy during the first trimester because
neither its interest in maternal health nor its interest in the
potential life of the fetus is sufficiently great at that stage. But
the insufficiency of the State's interest in maternal health is
48. See Andrea Asaro, The Judicial Portrayal of the Physician in Abortion Sterilization
Decisions: The Use and Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 51, 53-55
(1983); Stephen Wasby, Justice Harry A. Blackmun in the Burger Court, 11 HAMLINE L. REV.
183 (1988); Smolin, supra note 47, at 1016.
49. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 120.
50. See id. at 165.
51. Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975).
52. See id. at 11.
53. See id.
54. See id. at 9.
55. See id. at 11. Currently, more than 40 states and Washington D.C. still prohibit
abortions by nonphysicians. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra
note 1, Health Tab at 7; Curtis, supra note 33, at 445.
56. Menillo, 423 U.S. at 10 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 120).
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predicated upon the first trimester abortion's being as safe for
the woman as normal childbirth at term, and that predicate
holds true only if the abortion is performed by medically
competent personnel under conditions insuring maximum safety
for the woman.57
Thus, the Court limited the right to an abortion to an abortion performed
by "medically competent personnel" such as physicians.58
When Roe and Menillo were decided, the term "medically competent
personnel" was synonymous with "licensed physicians." In the early
1970s, the midlevel professions were relatively young.59 The professions
have since changed and their reputations and status have grown. 60
Physician assistants are licensed professionals who have completed an
accredited physician assistant program. 6' Many physician assistant
programs involve two years of graduate training.6' Menillo relied on the
assumption that abortions by nonphysicians are not as safe as abortions
by physicians .63 Recent studies have shown that this is no longer true
today when applied to midlevel practitioners. 64
E. Casey and the "Undue Burden" Standard
In 1992, with the decision in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the
Court replaced the strict scrutiny standard with the "undue burden"
standard.65 Under Casey, the right to an abortion during the first
trimester is no longer a fundamental right. However, the Court upheld
Roe's essential holding, recognizing the "right of the woman to choose to
have an abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue
57. Id. at 10-11.
58. Id. While Menillo permits states to prohibit nonphysicians from performing abortions,
it does not itself prohibit nonphysician abortions. Thus, state courts, state Departments of
Health, and attorney generals aic altc, at,. avenues reproductive rights advocates may pursue
in order to legalize abortions performed by physician assistants. See infra Part IV.
59. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146.
60. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 666-75.
61. See AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PHYSICIAN ASSISTANTS, INFORMATION ON THE
PHYSICIAN ASSISTANT PROFESSION (Summer 1997).
62. An example of such a program is the masters program at Duke University. See id.
However, the physician assistant program at Stanford University is only 15 months. The
Stanford program is offered only to applicants with extensive clinical and academic experience.
The average entering student has a post baccalaureate degree and five or more years of clinical
experience. Telephone Interview with Virginia Fowkes, Director of Primary Care Associate
Program, Stanford University, Palo Alto, Cal. (Oct. 29, 1997).
63. See 423 U.S. at 10-11.
64. See Mary Anne Freedman et al., Comparison of Complication Rates in First Trimester
Abortions Performed by Physician Assistants and Physicians, 76 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 550, 553
(1983); see infra Part II.C.
65. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
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interference from the state. "6 Under the current standard, a statute
which poses an "undue burden" on a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is unconstitutional.67 The Court defined an "undue burden"
as:
a shorthand for the conclusion that a state regulation has the purpose or
effect of placing a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking
an abortion of a nonviable fetus. A statute with this purpose is invalid
because the means chosen by the State to further the interest in potential
life must be calculated to inform the woman's free choice, not hinder
it.
68
In Casey, the Court upheld a twenty-four hour waiting period and a
requirement that abortion information and counseling be provided by a
physician prior to the abortion procedure because the restrictions related
to the state's interest in informing the woman's choice.69 The Court also
reaffirmed the constitutional validity of record keeping and reporting
provisions upheld in an earlier case, Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,7"
because they were "'reasonably directed to the preservation of maternal
health.'" 7
1
However, the Court held that if "the requirements serve no purpose
other than to make abortions more difficult," the statute is
unconstitutional.2 A statute which imposes an undue burden merely to
further a state's interest in fetal life is unconstitutional.' While a state
may "enact regulations to further the health or safety of a woman seeking
an abortion;" "[u.nnecessary health regulations that have the purpose or
66. Id. at 846. The Court stated,
Her suffering is too intimate and personal for the State to insist, without more, upon
its own vision of the woman's role, however dominant that vision has been in the
course of our history and our culture. The destiny of the woman must be shaped to a
large extent on her own conception of her spiritual imperatives and her place in
society.
Id. at 852. The Court continued, "the ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive
lives." Id. at 856.
67. See id. at 876.
68. Id. at 877. The Southern District of Indiana explained that the undue burden test in
Casey consists of "two independent prongs-the 'purpose' and the 'effects' prong. A statute
that fails either test is unconstitutional." A Woman's Choice-East Side Clinic v. Newman, No.
IP 95 1148-C H/G, slip op. at 9 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 1995).
69. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 877-88.
70. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 80 (1976).
71. Casey, 505 U.S. at 900 (quoting Danforth, 428 U.S. at 80).
72. Id. at 901.
73. "We answer the question.., whether a law designed to further the State's interest in
fetal life which imposes an undue burden on the woman's decision before fetal viability could
be constitutional. The answer is no." Id. at 877 (citations omitted).
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effect of presenting a substantial obstacle to a woman seeking an abortion
impose an undue burden on the right."74
While upholding the twenty-four hour waiting period and informed
consent requirements and reaffirming the record keeping and reporting
provisions, the Court left intact two prior decisions relevant to the issue
at hand. In Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc.,75 the Court
struck down the state requirement that second trimester abortions be
performed in a hospital.76 The Court held that such a requirement was
unconstitutional because there was no reasonable health justification.'
Similarly, in Doe v. Bolton,78 the Court found that requiring hospital
committee approval for all abortions was unduly restrictive and served no
legitimate purpose.79
There is no legitimate health justification for prohibiting physician
assistants from performing abortions.8" Physician assistants are medically
qualified to perform abortions. The complication rate of abortions
performed by physician assistants is minimal and equivalent to that of
abortions performed by physicians.81 Physician assistants have safely
provided abortions in New York, Montana, and Vermont. 2 Moreover,
midlevel practitioners provide numerous other medical services
traditionally thought to be within the exclusive purview of physicians.83
In fact, not permitting physician assistants to perform abortions may
result in increased risk to maternal health because of the shortage of
physicians willing to provide abortions. Problems of access, scarcity of
abortion providers, and the cost of an abortion can delay the abortion.'
This can result in increased risk to maternal health since the risk of
complications and mortality increases by at least 20% for each week after
the eighth. 85 Such problems could also result in attempts to self-abort or
obtain an abortion from an unqualified nonphysician. For some, it could
mean that they will have no choice but to carry to term because they do
not have the resources to access an abortion provider.
Although the language in Casey purports to protect women from "a
state regulation which has the purpose or effect of placing a substantial
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
76. See id. at 432.
77. See id.
78. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
79. See id. at 197.
80. See infra Part II.C.
81. See Freedman et al., supra note 63, at 553.
82. See infra Part II.C.
83. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 666-76.
84. See infra Part III.
85. See CHRISTOPHER TIETZE & STANLEY K. HENSHAW, INDUCED ABORTION: A
WORLD REVIEW 1986 109-10 (6th ed. 1986).
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obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion,"86 in effect, the
standard permits virtually any state regulation short of an outright
prohibition on abortion. In Casey, the Court upheld three out of four
regulations: the physician-only counseling requirement, the twenty-four
hour waiting period, and the parental consent requirement.17 The holding
in Casey does not take into account the existence of non-legal barriers,
such as financial considerations, travel arrangements, and increased
health risks. State laws such as those upheld in Casey, combined with
non-legal barriers may make it more difficult, if not impossible, for poor
women and women who live in rural areas without access to a local
provider to exercise their right to an abortion.8
F. 1997: Mazurek v. Armstrong and the Current Court
In a recent decision, the Supreme Court upheld a Montana statute
which prohibits physician assistants from performing abortions.8 9
However, the Supreme Court did not uphold the Montana Act based on a
health justification. Referring to a study finding no significant difference
in the complication rates for abortions performed by physicians compared
to abortions performed by physician assistants, the Court stated, "[W]e
emphasized [in Casey] that '[o]ur cases reflect the fact that the
Constitution gives the States broad latitude to decide that particular
functions may be performed only by [physicians], even if an objective
assessment might suggest that those same tasks could be performed by
others.'" '  In Casey, the Court upheld a State requirement that
information and counseling relating to abortion must be provided by a
licensed physician.91  The information could not be provided by
86. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
87. See id. at 887, 899. The only provision the Court struck down was a requirement that
a married woman notify her spouse before obtaining an abortion. See id. at 895. This was also
the only restriction which would affect non-rural, middle class, married women.
88. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 937 (Blackmun, I., dissenting). In his dissent in Casey,
Justice Blackmun stated:
The 24-hour waiting period following the provision of the foregoing information
is... clearly unconstitutional. The District Court found that the mandatory 24-hour
delay could lead to delays in excess of 24 hours, thus increasing health risks, and that
it would require two visits to the abortion provider, thereby increasing travel time,
exposure to further harassment, and financial cost. Finally, the District Court found
that the requirement would pose especially significant burdens on women living in
rural areas and those women that have difficulty explaining their whereabouts.
Id.
89. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865, 1869 (1997).
90. Id. at 1867 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 885).
91. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 876; Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1866 ("That requirement [in
Casey] involved only the provision of information to patients, and not the actual performance of
abortions, yet we nonetheless held.., that the limitation to physicians was valid.").
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counselors or nonphysician medical personnel.' Pointing to this
decision, the Court upheld the prerogative of a state to regulate that the
actual abortion be performed by a physician.93
Susan Cahill, a physician assistant who had been safely performing
abortions under the supervision of Doctor James Armstrong, is the only
physician assistant directly affected by the legislation at issue. 94 In her
almost twenty years of performing abortions, Physician Assistant Cahill
had never been the subject of disciplinary actions or malpractice claims. 5
As with much of the anti-abortion legislation across the nation, the
Montana statute was enacted as a result of efforts to decrease the number
of abortion providers and availability of abortion services in the state.9
In Montana, the number of licensed medical practitioners willing to
perform abortions dropped from twenty in 1982 to twelve in 1996,
primarily due to increasing harassment against providers. 7 Susan Cahill
was one of these twelve providers. She and Dr. Armstrong had been the
targets of threats and harassment. 9 Their offices were firebombed, yet
they continued to provide safe and legal abortions for women in
Montana. 9 Now, as a result of the Montana legislation the number of
licensed providers willing and able to provide abortions has dropped to
eleven for the entire state.100
II. The Current Politics of Midlevels
A. Pro-Choice and Pro-Life Advocates Square Off
Although some physicians and pro-choice groups express
reservations about the use of midlevel providers in the abortion context,
the "physician-only" issue has become another skirmish in the battle
between pro-life and pro-choice groups, with concerns about maternal
health being lost along the way. The key proponents of measures to keep
92. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 885.
93. See Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1867.
94. See id.
95. See Brief for Plaintiffs-Appellants at 4, Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566 (1996)
(No. 95-083-GFPGH) [hereinafter CRLP Brief].
96. See id. at 4-8.
97. See id. at 4.
98. See id. at 4-8.
99. See id.
100. The statute only affected one physician assistant, Susan Cahill. See Mazurek, 117 S.
Ct. at 1867. However, the ability to delegate first trimester abortions to Cahill "freed Dr.
Armstrong to do the complicated procedures ... [a]nd he is the only physician in Montana-a
state where no hospital does abortions-that will perform one after 18 weeks." Judy Peres &
Glen Elasser, Supreme Court Gives, Takes in Abortion Cases, CHI. TRIB., June 17, 1997, at 3.
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physician, assistants from performing abortions are anti-abortion
organizations, not pro-choice groups or physicians. Immediately after
the Mazurek decision upholding the Montana statute, Clarke Forsythe of
Americans United for Life referred to the decision as "a significant
public health victory."'O' Another spokesperson for Americans United
for Life stated that the decision "affirms once again that states may pass
regulations with respect to abortion."" ° On the pro-choice side, Janet
Benshoof, president of the Center for Reproductive Law and Policy,
called the decision "a devastating acceptance of discrimination against
abortion providers."" 3 While maternal health is hailed as the goal of the
physician-only statutes, the debate is being waged between pro-choice
and pro-life activists with midlevel providers being the easiest targets in
pro-life efforts to make abortion inaccessible, costly, and ultimately
illegal.
B. Legalizing Abortions Performed by Midlevels: Pro-Choice
Politics
With the changes in medical care and the rise of managed care in the
United States, midlevel providers are providing more and more of the
services once provided by physicians." Midlevel practitioners are
authorized to perform a range of medical services, often under a
physician's supervision. 105  However, the extent of the physician's
supervision varies. In HMOs and hospitals, midlevels often work under
the direct supervision of a physician."° Yet, in many community clinics,
physician assistants and nurse practitioners are the primary clinicians,
ordering tests, prescribing medication, providing exams and performing
surgeries, using doctors only on call or in consultation. 7
Many doctors and physician medical associations resist the changes
in the medical profession which have resulted in these increases in
responsibility and autonomy in the midlevel professions." These
101. Ban on Nonphysician Abortions Upheld, S.F. CHRON., June 17, 1997, at A3.
102. Peres & Elasser, supra note 100, at 3.
103. Id.
104. See BOSTON WOMEN's HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 661, 671-75.
105. See id. at 666-67.
106. See id.
107. See id.
108. Reacting to a primary health care practice opened by four nurse practitioners in
Manhattan, Dr. Charles Aswad, executive vice president of the New York Medical Society
stated, "The public has a right to ask for a real doctor ... [w]e think the public has to be
protected from the representation that a nurse clinician is equivalent in training to a physician."
Milt Freudenheim, As Nurses Take on Primary Care, Physicians Are Sounding Alarms, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 30, 1997, at Al.
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reservations also exist in the context of abortion."° The concerns of
physicians toward legalizing abortions by midlevel providers mirror the
pre-Roe concerns about abortion."' Some doctors worry about
competition and see the licensing of physician assistants as a threat to
their income."' Others fear that a laxity in licensing requirements will
result in decreased safety for women."'
Among pro-choice organizations and individuals, the response to
legalizing abortions performed by midlevel providers has been mixed.
Planned Parenthood only uses physicians in their clinics. " 4 Meanwhile,
the individual administrators, staff, and providers at Planned Parenthood
are divided over the issue of whether to use midlevel practitioners as
abortion providers. "'
Proponents of the new health care facility explain that nurse practitioners cost less, are
more accessible, and are able to spend more time educating and treating their patients, and are
thus better able to focus on preventative care. Wendy Routh, whose daughter is a patient of a
nurse practitioner, explained, "If there is a cold or the flu or croup, she is there for me....
She has even made house calls at 2 A.M. to give my daughter an injection." Id. at Al.
109. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7. According to Ron Fitzsimmons, executive director of the National Coalition of Abortion
Providers, "There are doctors who feel that [the increased responsibility of midlevel providers]
is an affront to their expertise and their years of training." Id.
110. See supra Part I.B.
111. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at7.
112. See id. A physician who performs abortions in Reno, Nevada, stated that he is
worried that there would be no physician or hospital backup in rural areas in the event of
complications, and, furthermore, that lessening the standards for abortion providers would
result in medical policies which require lower safety requirements for women seeking abortions
than for those people who seek other surgical procedures. See id. However, the vice chairman
of the department of Obstetrics and Gynecology at the University of California, San Francisco
supports recognition that medically trained nonphysicians are qualified to provide services such
as abortion. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id. After the Mazurek decision, a spokesperson for Planned Parenthood of New
York criticized the decision, explaining that the holding "could be read as giving the green light
to legislation whose sole purpose is to restrict access to safe abortion." Peres & Elasser, supra
note 100, at 3. Planned Parenthood has not sought to use midlevel practitioners as abortion
providers. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health
Tab at 7. Jerry Hulka, chairman of Planned Parenthood's national medical committee,
explained that, while personally in favor of permitting nonphysicians to perform abortions, the
clinic administrators are concerned that a provider without the necessary medical training could
not handle complications should they arise. See id.
This concern, that nurse practitioners, physician assistants, or certified nurse midwives
would not be able to handle possible complications should they arise, is the predominant reason
pro-choice organizations and providers give for being reluctant to utilize midlevel practitioners
as abortion providers.
The alternative for a woman in a rural area with no physician providers would be to forego
having an abortion, or seek an abortion in a town or in another state and return home to the
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Many pro-choice groups and' physicians support the inclusion of
physician assistants, certified nurse practitioners, and nurse practitioners
in the performance of first trimester abortions. 16 In 1994, the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG) recommended that
nonphysicians be trained to perform low risk first trimester abortions. 117
Recently, a national symposium exploring the shortage of practitioners
willing to provide abortions, jointly sponsored by ACOG and the
National Abortion Federation (NAF), recommended "[elncouraging
physicians and clinics to train and integrate midlevel clinicians into
abortion service delivery" and to "[e]ncourage and facilitate national
professional societies of midlevel clinicians to provide avenues and
incentives for training in abortion care. " "'
Other groups, primarily consisting of midlevel providers, express
concern that because of harassment by pro-life activists, doctors are
seeking to avoid their responsibilities by delegating the provision of
abortion services to mid-level providers.' Rachel Atkins, director of the
Vermont Women's Health Center stated that physician assistants "should
same issue of access and potential complications. Moreover, the same objection to midlevel
provider care could be made of many of the procedures currently performed by nonphysicians.
The need for physician backup in case of complications is not unique to abortion. Physician
assistants, certified nurse midwives and nurse pracitioners perform numerous medical
procedures, many of which are more complex and have a higher rate of complication than
abortion. They have addressed the need for medical backup by forming relationships with
doctors and emergency rooms. For example, nonphysicians currently assist in childbirth. If
there are complications during delivery and a woman needs a cesarean section, a physician
assistant, certified nurse midwife or nurse practitioner would need to call for physician back up.
What also must be considered is that while concern about post-abortion complications is
important, it is not as central an issue as it may seem. The actual rate of complications in first
trimester abortions is extremely low. Less than 1% of abortions result in complications. See
D.A. Grimes & W. Cates, Jr., Complications from Legally-induced Abortion: A Review, 34
OBSTET. GYNECOL. SURV. 3, 177-191 (1979). Because a nonphysician is qualified to perform
abortions and it is only in the case of complications that a physician will be called, it is rare that
a physician will be needed. Physicians are more likely to agree to providing back-up support
for abortion services where they would not have agreed to be the primary provider of the
services. See Telephone Interview with Susan Dudley, supra note 18. The National Abortion
Federation (NAF) is involved in lobbying and education concerning the performance of
abortions by trained nonphysicians. NAF uses networking in all three professional groups:
nurse practitioners, physician assistants, and certified nurse midwives, in order to increase
awareness of the issue. NAF asserts that all three professional groups are competent to perform
abortions. The barriers which exist are due to legal constraints and bias toward physician-only
treatment. See id.
116. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
117. See id.; see also Donald P. Judges, Taking Care Seriously: Relational Feminism,
Sexual Difference, and Abortion, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1325, 1466 (1995).
118. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 24-25.
119. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
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not be allowed to do a procedure just because doctors don't want to do it,
but because it makes good medical sense. " " A spokeswoman for the
American Academy of Nurse Midwives said, "[W]e don't necessarily
believe that just because someone is willing to delegate a task means that
we would be willing to do it."121
C. Competency of Physician Assistants and Other Midlevel
Providers to Perform Abortions
Physician assistants, nurse practitioners, and certified nurse
midwives are currently able to perform procedures which involve equal
or greater risk and similar techniques to those utilized during the abortion
procedure."2 Physician assistants perform cervical biopsies, endometrial
biopsies, and cryosurgery. " They also perform the routine
gynecological and obstetrical care at many women's health clinics
including IUD and Norplant insertions and removals, pelvic exams,
testing and treatment for sexually transmitted diseases, and prenatal
care. 124
Besides performing procedures involving greater risk of
complication than abortion, midlevel providers perform virtually all of
the steps involved in a first trimester abortion in other contexts. During a
vacuum aspiration or vacuum suction procedure the clinician first inserts
the speculum into the vagina. 126 Next, she injects a local anesthesia into
the cervix, holding the cervix in place with the use of a tenaculum
clamp. 27 She then dilates the cervix slightly (approximately eight
millimeters for a first trimester abortion).128 Using a tube attached to an
electrically powered suction machine called an aspirator, the clinician
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1020
(1980). In Montana, physician assistants are authorized to perform approximately 200 different
medical procedures and treatments. Many of these procedures have greater risk than first
trimester abortions, including delivering babies. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95, at 5.
123. See Brief of the New York Civil Liberties Union at 12, Declaratory Ruling by the
N.Y. Dept. of Health (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with the New York Civil Liberties Union)
(Requesting Declaratory Opinion by the New York Department of Public Health that Physician
Assistants Can Perform Abortions Under the Supervision of Qualified Physicians) [hereinafter
NYCLU Brief].
124. Based on this author's experience as Prenatal Services Coordinator and High Risk
Teen Counselor at Planned Parenthood Mar Monte's East San Jose Clinic (1993-95).
125. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95, at 5.
126. See BOSTON WOMEN'S HEALTH COLLECTIVE, supra note 8, at 356-58.
127. See id.
128. See id.
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removes the contents of the uterus." 9 Depending upon the clinician, a
curette can also be used to scrape the inside of the uterus. 30
Virtually all of these steps are present in other contexts. Midlevel
providers routinely use the speculum during gynecological exams.131 The
endometrial biopsy requires the administration of local anesthesia.132 The
IUD insertion involves the use of the tenaculum clamp.133  The
endometrial biopsy and removal of lodged IUDs require that the clinician
dilate the cervix.'34 In these other contexts the midlevel provider is
currently undertaling almost all of the steps required to perform a first
trimester abortion. In addition, midlevel practitioners provide prenatal
care and deliver babies. Childbirth has a mortality rate ten times that of
first trimester abortions. 35
In fact, physician assistants have been safely performing abortions in
Vermont, Montana and New York.136  Physician Assistant Cahill had
safely provided abortions for nineteen years. 37  At the Vermont
Women's Health Center, physician assistants have performed abortions
for over ten years,13 ' and in New York, 29% of physician assistants
report having performed first trimester abortions. 39  Furthermore,
physician assistants have been training medical students in Vermont for
over sixteen years."" A 1986 study of 2500 first trimester abortions
performed by physician assistants found no difference in the rate of
complications for abortions performed by physician assistants versus
physicians. 4  It is worth noting that the rate of complications in
129. See id.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 563, 675.
132. See NYCLU Brief, supra note 123, at 12.
133. See id.
134. See id.
135. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95, at 5.
136. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146-48.
137. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95, at 5.
138. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
139. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 147.
140. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
141. See Freedman et al., supra note 64, at 553; see also Boodman, Should Non-Physicians
Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7. The only study available involves physician
assistants. According to the NAF and the medical associations for certified nurse midwives and
nurse practitioners, certified nurse midwives and nurse practitioners are medically competent to
perform first trimester abortions. Telephone Interview with Susan Dudley, supra note 18;
Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146. However, because of the differing regulations
and regulating bodies for the three medical professions and the varying laws among the several
states, it has been easier and may continue to be easier for physician assistants to begin
performing abortions. Telephone Interview with Susan Dudley, supra note 18. Furthermore, a
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abortions performed by physician assistants was slightly lower than that
of physicians under similar conditions.142
For the above reasons, maternal health and safety are no longer
viable reasons for prohibiting abortions by physician assistants and other
midlevel providers.
III. Barriers to Access
A. Diminishing Provider Pool
The United States is currently suffering from a shortage of
physicians willing to provide abortions. 143  In 1990, NAF and ACOG
convened a national symposium to "explore the shortage of physicians
willing to provide abortion and make recommendations to end it." 144
According to a 1992 survey by the Alan Guttmacher Institute, 84% of all
counties in the United States had no abortion provider. 145  Of patients
seeking to terminate their pregnancies, 9% travel more than 100 miles to
find a provider, and 18% travel 50-100 miles. 146 In North Dakota and
South Dakota, only one doctor provides abortions for the entire state. 14
There are several factors contributing to the shortage of providers: (1)
anti-abortion harassment and violence against physicians; (2) physicians
who currently perform abortions are nearing retirement; and (3) the
sparse number of new physicians motivated or trained to perform
abortions.
first trimester abortion is considered one of the safest surgical procedures. CRLP Brief, supra
note 95, at 5 n.2.
142. Physician assistants had a total complication rate of 20.1 out of 1000 procedures
compared to 26.0 out of 1000 procedures for physicians. See Freedman et al., supra note 64,
at 555.
143. See Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7; Boodman,
Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7.
144. RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 1.
145. See Henshaw & Van Vort, supra note 2, at 100.
146. See Stanley K. Henshaw, The Accessibility of Abortion Services in the United States,
23 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 246, 246-52 (1991). Note that these statistics are based upon 1988
figures. The problem of access has worsened as a result of the continually decreasing pool of
medically licensed providers willing to perform abortions. See Boodman, Dearth of Abortion
Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7. By 1990, the time of the NAF/ACOG Symposium,
84% of counties had no abortion provider. See RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 4.
147. NATIONAL ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS ACTION LEAGUE FOUNDATION,
WHO DECIDES? A STATE-BY-STATE REvIEw OF ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS, 1997
viii (1997) [hereinafter NARAL, WHO DECIDES?].
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(1) Violence Against Doctors
Anti-abortion forces have actively targeted clinics and physicians
providing abortion services.148 The campaign against abortion has largely
consisted of non-violent picketing and dispersion of information.
However, some pro-life activists have resorted to harassment and
violence, bombing clinics and shooting doctors and health care workers
who assist in providing abortion and family planning services. 149 As a
result, the number of physicians willing to provide abortion services is
diminishing. 50  Along with restrictions on abortions, the decreasing
provider pool results in an even greater burden for women seeking to
terminate their pregnancies.
(2) The "Graying" of the Abortion Doctors
In addition, the provider pool is shrinking as the physicians who
currently perform abortions retire or become too old to perform
abortions.' Newspaper articles and pro-choice activists refer to the
current pool of providers as the "graying" abortion doctors because so
many of those who choose to continue providing services are getting
older, while the number of young doctors joining their ranks is
diminishing.' 52 Many of these "graying" doctors continue to perform
abortions, traveling into underserved communities, and delaying
retirement because they remember a time when abortions were not
legal.'53 Many served their residency pre-Roe and remember seeing the
results of botched abortions when women did not have access to safe and
legal abortions." 4 The younger physicians and medical school graduates
do not have these memories to drive them to enter a field which pays less
than other surgeries and will subject them to harassment and possibly
violence. 55
148. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7; Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7; Death by an
Extremist's Gun, supra note 3, at B6; Castaneda, supra note 3, at A3.
149. See Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7.
150. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
151. See Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id.
155. See id.
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(3) No Replacements: Harassment of Medical Students
Medical students and schools are among those targeted by anti-
abortion groups. 116 Shortly after the shooting and killing of Dr. David
Gunn (a physician who performed abortions) by a pro-life activist,'57
33,000 medical students received an anti-abortion booklet which
contained the following joke:
Q.What would you do if you found yourself in a room with Hitler,
Mussolini and an abortionist and you had a gun with only two bullets?
A. Shoot the abortionist twice. 158
Bruce Cadle of Operation Rescue said, "'We may not get laws
changed or be able to change people's minds .... [b]ut if there is no one
willing to conduct abortions, there are no abortions." 5 9
A study from 1991 showed that only 12% of American medical
schools and residency programs have programs which include training in
abortion procedures."&6 Those which did provide abortion education and
training provided it as an elective. 6 ' Considering the threat implied in
the pro-life propaganda sent to medical students, the lack of training
provided in medical school, and the lower pay involved in providing
abortion services, 62 the diminishing number of doctors is not likely to
increase in the near future. 163
Because of the decreasing number of physicians willing to provide
abortions, a solution to the problem of access would be to increase the
provider pool by increasing the pool of qualified medical providers who
may perform abortions. As the 1986 study comparing complication rates
156. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
157. Dr. David Gunn, a physician who lived in Alabama, performed abortions at clinics in
Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. Dr. Gunn had been the target of harassment for years. The
summer before the shooting, his photograph and phone number were passed around by anti-
abortion protesters in Alabama. On March 10, 1993, Dr. Gunn was shot and killed by anti-
abortion protester Michael Griffin outside a clinic in Pensacola, Florida. See Death by an
Extremist's Gun, supra note 3, at B6; Castaneda, supra note 3, at A3.
158. Boodman, Dearth of Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7 (citations
omitted).
159. Id.
160. See Boodman, Should Non-Physicians Perform Abortions?, supra note 1, Health Tab
at 7.
161. See id.
162. Abortion is one of the lowest paid surgical procedures. See Boodman, Dearth of
Abortion Doctors, supra note 1, Health Tab at 7.
163. In 1993, in response to the absence of abortion training in medical schools, a group of
medical students formed Medical Students for Choice. Medical Students for Choice now has
groups at over 100 medical schools and has approximately 4000 medical student members
nationwide. Their national office is located in Berkeley, California. Telephone Interview with
Shelley O'Neil, National Student Organizer, Medical Students for Choice (Dec. 18, 1997).
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between physician assistants and physicians demonstrates, 4 physician
assistants are qualified to perform abortions. Permitting physician
assistants to enter the provider pool would increase access to safe, legal
abortions.
B. Catholic Hospital Mergers
Some physicians and medical students Who would be willing to
provide abortions are prohibited by the hospitals they are affiliated with.
Under the policies of the Catholic Church, Catholic hospitals do not
provide or make referrals for abortion services. This prohibition
extends to hospital physicians and residents, regardless of the individual's
religion or position on abortion. Furthermore, Catholic hospitals do not
limit their restrictions to abortions."6  They also prohibit physicians,
residents, and other staff members from performing tubal ligations and
vasectomies, and discussing or dispensing birth control.167  Many
hospitals also prohibit dispensing the morning after pill for women who
have been raped.64
The Catholic Church is the largest nonprofit provider of health
services, and the number of Catholic hospitals is increasing as hospitals
merge. 169  Last year alone, there were twenty-nine mergers between
Catholic and non-Catholic hospitals, which resulted in Catholic law being
imposed on the medical providers and hospital staff.170
C. Scheduling Barriers: Practical Effects on Abortion Access
At Planned Parenthood Mar Monte, which consists of twenty-seven
Planned Parenthood clinics in Northern California, physician assistants
164. See Freedman et al., supra note 63, at 553.
165. See Esther B. Fein, Hospital Deals Raise Concern on Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14,
1997, at B1.
166. See id.
167. See id.; see also Patricia Donovan, Hospital Mergers and Reproductive Health Care,
28 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 281 (1996).
168. See id.
169. See Fein, supra note 165, at BI; see also Anne E. Kornblut, N.H. Hospital to Ban
Abortions; Decision Reached After Objections by Catholic Church, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 11,
1997, at B8; Alex Pham, State Regulators OK Caritas Takeover Plans, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov.
26, 1997, at C9.
170. Two nonprofit groups, the Abortion Access Project in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and
Catholics for a Free Choice, organize and educate the community in order to defeat mergers
with Catholic hospitals and expand the availability of abortion services in non-Catholic
hospitals. Some mergers have not gone through as a result of community protests. See Fein,
supra note 165, at B1. See generally NATIONAL ABORTION AND REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS
ACTION LEAGUE FOUNDATION/NY FOUNDATION, THE HOSPITAL PROVIDER PROJECT (1997).
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and nurse practitioners can provide all of the clinics' obstetric and
gynecological care, except for abortion.17' These nonphysician providers
perform the gynecological exams, treat patients for sexually transmitted
diseases, insert and remove IUDs and Norplants, and perform prenatal
care." Abortions are provided in most clinics one morning or evening a
week where a contracted physician comes to the clinic to perform
abortions. 73 The clinicians leave, and the rest of the clinic shuts down. 74
This is done so that the abortion procedures can all be scheduled on the
one day the doctor visits. 175
This manner of scheduling is the most convenient for doctors and
abortion clinics under the current circumstances which restrict
nonphysician abortion services. However, such a schedule is often
inconvenient for patients who can only have the procedure done on one
day of the week, must schedule a ride to and from the clinic and days off
work, and must see a different provider than their regular clinician.
Furthermore, it subjects the doctor and patient to greater harassment and
violation of privacy because the pro-life protesters can concentrate their
efforts on the scheduled day and the protesters know what procedure the
patient has come to receive.
The provision of abortion services by nurse practitioners and
physician assistants would be more practical and efficient at the clinic
level as these midlevel providers are the primary health care practitioners
at many family planning clinics, providing exams, birth control, and
obstetric care services. 176
D. Cost
Additionally, the cost of abortion services can be prohibitive. In
1993, the average woman paid $296 for a first trimester abortion, $604
for an abortion at sixteen weeks, and $1067 for an abortion at twenty
weeks."7 The cost of an abortion for a woman on welfare is often her
entire monthly welfare payment. 7 8 Some states, such as California and
171. Based on this author's experience as Prenatal Services Coordinator and High Risk
Teen Counselor at Planned Parenthood Mar Monte's East San Jose Clinic (1993-1995).
172. See id.
173. See id.
174. See id.
175. See id.
176. See id.
177. See Henshaw, supra note 146, at 263.
178. For example, in Texas, a woman with two children receives $184 per month. The
cost of an abortion is $257, 140% of her total monthly income. See Issues in Brief The Cost
Implications of Including Abortion Coverage Under Medicaid tbl. 2 (Alan Guttmacher Institute
Mar. 1995).
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New York, cover abortions through their medical assistance programs."
The majority of states, however, only cover abortion services in the case
of rape, incest or life endangerment. 8 For women who are working,
only 50% have health insurance.' Even for those with health insurance,
many policies do not cover abortions." Because of the prohibitive cost
of an abortion, many women who would otherwise choose abortion
continue their pregnancy." 3 Others postpone the procedure, increasing
the risk of complication or even death, in order to secure sufficient
funds. 18
Training nonphysicians to perform first trimester abortions would
lower the often prohibitive cost of procuring a first trimester abortion for
three reasons: first, an increase in the number of providers would result
in a decrease in cost; second, nonphysicians are paid less for their
services than physicians;" third, nurse practitioners and physician
assistants are already employed and salaried by family planning clinics,
therefore obviating the need to contract separately for abortion services.
This would obviate the need for physicians to incur the expense of
traveling large distances in order to meet the needs of underserved
-populations. If nonphysician providers, such as nurse practitioners and
physician assistants, were to provide abortion services it would make
abortions more accessible by increasing the provider pool and lowering
the cost of the procedure.
186
179. See So Poor Women Can Choose, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1993, at A18.
180. See Clinton Seeking to Repeal Medicaid Abortion Ban, ATLANTA J., Mar. 30, 1993, at
Al.
181. See Curtis, supra note 33, at 431.
182. See id.
183. For example, in states where abortion is not publicly funded, 18-23% of Medicaid
eligible women who wanted abortions carried to term. See James Trussell, The Impact of
Restricting Medicaid Financing forAbortion, 12 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 120, 129 (1980).
184. According to a study in Missouri, 22% of Medicaid eligible women who had second
trimester abortions would have had first trimester abortions if funding had been available. See
Stanley K. Henshaw & Lynn S. Wallisch, The Medicaid Cutoff and Abortion Services for the
Poor, 16 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 170, 178 (1984). Difficulty in acquiring sufficient funds for an
abortion may result in an increased risk to maternal health since the risk of complications and
mortality increase by at least 20% for each week after week eight that a woman must wait to
secure sufficient funds for an abortion. See TETZE & HENSHAW, supra note 85, at 109-10.
185. See Evelyn Figueroa & Mette Kurth, Recent Developments: Madsen and the Face
Act: Abortion Rights or Traffic Control?, 5 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 247, 274 (1994).
186. See id.
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IV. Lessons from Vermont, New York, and Montana
In most states, the existing abortion statutes require that an abortion
be performed by a licensed physician.'87 Many of these statutes were
passed around the time Roe was decided. 188  At the same time, states
passed laws regulating the medical practice of physician assistants. 189
The laws governing the practice of physician assistants are typically very
broad, placing discretion as to which procedures and tests physician
assistants may perform in the hands of the supervising physician."9 For
example, Vermont's statute regulating the profession of physician
assistants defines a physician assistant as "an individual certified by the
state ... who is qualified by education, training, experience, and
personal character to provide medical services under the direction and
supervision of a ... licensed physician."' 91 These laws generally permit
the physician assistant to perform medical tests and procedures and
prescribe medications at the discretion of the supervising physician."9
The physician assistant's practice is limited only by the scope of practice
of the supervising physician.' 93
187. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146. In New York, for example, the
state did not abolish the pre-Roe abortion law. Section 125.40 of the New York Penal Code
states, "A person is guilty of abortion.., when he commits an abortional act upon a female,
unless such abortional act is justifiable." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.40 (Consol. 1996). In 1970,
the New York legislature legalized abortion by redefining an abortional act as one
"ommitted ... by a duly licensed physician." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.05(3) (Consol. 1996).
The Montana Abortion Control Act states, "An abortion may not be performed within the state
of Montana: (a) except by a licensed physician." MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1995).
188. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146.
189. See id. New York's physician assistant regulations state, "Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, a physician assistant may perform medical services, but only when under the
supervision of a physician and only when such acts and duties as are assigned to him are within
the scope of practice of such supervising physician." N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6542(1) (Consol.
1996). Vermont's statute regulating the profession of physician assistants defines a physician
assistant as "an individual certified by the state of Vermont who is qualified by education,
training, experience and personal character to provide medical services under the direction and
supervision of a Vermont licensed physician." VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1732(4) (1996).
Montana requires that the physician assistant and physician form a utilization plan and that "the
practice of the physician assistant-certified [under the utilization plan] is (a) assigned by the
supervising physician; (b) within the scope of the training, knowledge, experience of the
supervisory physician; and (c) within the scope of the training, knowledge, education, and
experience of the physician assistant-certified." MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-20-301(3) (1995).
190. See, e.g., N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6542 (1) (Consol. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-20-
301(3) (1995).
191. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1732(4) (1996) (emphasis added).
192. See id.
193. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6542(1) (Consol. 1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-20-301(3)
(1995).
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Today, physician assistants and other midlevel providers perform
numerous procedures. 19 However, the legal status of physician assistant-
provided abortions has remained unclear in most states because of the
seeming conflict between the broad physician assistant statutes and the
physician-only provisions in the abortion laws.
Under the physician assistant regulations, physician assistants may
perform medical services and procedures under the supervision of a
physician. " A physician assistant's practice area is limited to the
practicing area of the supervising physician. Thus, under the physician
assistant regulations, if a physician assistant's supervising physician
specialized in pediatric care, the physician assistant's practice would be
limited to pediatrics. If the supervising physician specialized in obstetrics
and gynecology, the physician assistant's practice area could include
abortion as well as other gynecological and obstetric services.
This apparent conflict between the abortion and physician assistant
statutes has caused confusion among providers and medical facilities.196
Vermont, New York, and Montana illustrate differing methods and
approaches to facilitating the legalization of physician assistant-provided
abortions.
A. Vermont
In states such as Vermont, the abortion laws do not contain a
physician-only provision." Thus, physician assistants may perform
abortions under the physician assistant guidelines which broadly define a
physician assistant as "an individual certified by the state.., who is
qualified by education, training, experience, and personal character to
provide medical services under the direction and supervision of
a... licensed physician."198 Physician assistants have been performing
abortions in Vermont since 1973 and currently provide one third of the
abortions in the state. 199 Physician assistants in Vermont also provide
abortion training for medical residents from the University of Vermont,
194. See supra Part ll.C.
195. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1732(4) (1996); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6542 (1) (Consol.
1996); MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-20-301(3) (1995).
196. For example, in New York, the New York City Health and Hospital Corporation and
New York City Public Hospitals refused to allow physician assistants to perform abortions
(even though 29% of New York physician assistants reported performing abortions) because the
corporation and hospital feared criminal prosecution under the physician-only statute. See
NYCLU Brief, supra note 123, at 2.
197. See Lieberman & L lwani, supra note 17, at 146. Arizona, Kansas, New Hampshire,
Oregon, Vermont, and West Virginia do not have provisions limiting abortions to physicians.
See id.
198. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 1732(4) (1996).
199. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 148.
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which does not provide training in abortion.' The Vermont Women's
Health Center participated in the only study available analyzing abortions
performed by physician assistants. Abortions performed by supervised
physician assistants actually had fewer abortion complications than those
performed by physicians under similar conditions." Thus, in states such
as Vermont, where there is no physician-only provision in the abortion
statute, the physician assistant statute alone provides the legal basis for
abortions performed by physician assistants.
B. New York
New York, a state with a physician-only provision in its abortion
statute, has necessarily had to resolve the issue differently. The New
York Department of Health issued a declaratory ruling that New York's
physician-only requirement does not apply to physician assistants.
New York's abortion statute legalizes abortions when
"committed... by a duly licensed physician."' However, New York's
physician assistant regulations do not restrict physician assistants from
performing abortions. 3  The physician assistant statute states,
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, a physician assistant may
perform medical services, but only when under the supervision of a
physician and only when such acts and duties as are assigned to him are
within the scope of practice of such supervising physician."o This
seeming conflict between the abortion statute and the physician assistant
regulations caused some confusion among New York medical
providers.m3
In response to demonstrated reluctance on the part of some health
care entities to permit physician assistants to perform abortions (because
they feared prosecution under the abortion statute), the New York Civil
Liberties Union requested a declaratory ruling from the New York
Department of Health that physician assistants may perform abortions
under the direction of their supervising physician.' The State
Department of Public Health ruled that because 1) the physician assistant
statute was enacted after the abortion statute, and 2) the penal statutes
must be read "to promote justice and effect the objects of the law," the
200. See RECOMMENDATIONS FROM A NATIONAL SYMPOSIUM, supra note 6, at 25.
201. Physician assistants experienced 20.1 complications per 1000 procedures versus 26.0
complications for physicians. See Freedman et al., supra note 64, at 555.
202. N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.05(3) (consol. 1996).
203. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6542 (1) (consol. 1996).
204. Id.
205. See NYCLU Brief, supra note 123, at 2.
206. See generally id.
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physician-only requirement in the New York abortion statute does not
apply to physician assistants.2 7
(1) The Physician Assistant Regulations Were Enacted After the Abortion
Statute
When New York's abortion statute was amended in 1970 to legalize
abortion, it restricted legal abortions to abortions "committed... by a
duly licensed physician."" 8  The statute regulating the practice of
physician assistants was enacted in 1971, after the abortion statute was
amended to included the physician-only provision.' The physician
assistant statute states, "[nJotwithstanding any other provision of law, a
physician assistant may perform medical services, but only when under
the supervision of a physician and only when such acts and duties as are
assigned to him are within the scope of practice of such supervising
physician.'21O In New York, the New York Department of Health ruled
that because the physician assistant statute was enacted after the abortion
statute and includes the language "[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law," the physician assistant statute supersedes the abortion statute. 211
Thus, according to the Department of Health ruling, the physician-only
requirement in New York does not apply to physician assistants.212
(2) Penal Statutes Must Be Read to Promote Justice and Effect the
Objects of the Law
Additionally, where statutes conflict, the court (or in this case the
governing regulatory body) must look at the legislative intent and attempt
to reconcile the statutes. 13 The physician-only abortion statute was
enacted as part of the State's efforts to legalize abortion. 214  The
207. Declaratory Ruling by the N.Y. Dept. of Health (Dec. 20, 1994) (on file with the
New York Civil Liberties Union).
208. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 125.05 (consol. 1996).
209. See Declaratory Ruling by the N.Y. Dept. of Health, supra note 207.
210. N.Y. EDUC. LAw § 6542 (1) (consol. 1996) (emphasis added).
211. Declaratory Ruling by the N.Y. Dept. of Health, supra note 207.
212. See id.
213. See Sun Beach Real Estate Development Corp. v. Anderson, 469 N.Y.S.2d 964, 967
(2nd Dep't 1983), aff'd 62 N.Y.2d 963 (1984); Matter of Luis R., 414 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1000
(Farn. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1979).
214. See Lieberman & Lalwani, supra note 17, at 146-47. Approaching the state
department of health or state attorney general (depending upon which agency may be friendliest
to abortion providers) is another option for advocates of abortion by midlevel providers. See
id. But see 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101, 108 (1991) ("We cannot accept the notion that the
Legislature meant to gainsay the carefully tailored and highly specific determination [that
abortions should be performed by licensed physicians] when it ... adopted the general
language of the Physician Assistant Practice Act.").
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Commission appointed to review the abortion law recommended
amending the statute to legalize abortion because "[d]eaths, sterility and
harm to physical and mental health resulting from a large number of
illegal abortions each year could largely be prevented if such abortions
were performed by competent physicians in proper hospital surroundings,
within the framework of reasonable legislation."
21 5
Rather than repeal the existing statute which proscribed abortion
"unless such abortional act is justifiable," 21 6 the New York legislature
amended the definition of "justifiable abortional act" to an abortion
"committed upon a female with her consent by a duly licensed
physician."2 7 The purpose of the physician-only requirement was to
"assure that abortions are performed safely and by competent medical
personnel. "21 8 As discussed above, physician assistants are medically
competent to provide abortions.2 9
The physician assistant statute, on the other hand, was enacted in
order "to increase access to competent medical care."' Permitting
physician assistants to perform abortions would result in an increase in
the number of qualified abortion providers and thereby facilitate the
physician assistant statute's purpose. Thus, read together, permitting
physician assistants to perform abortions would further the purpose of
both the abortion and physician assistant statutes by providing safe, legal,
and accessible abortion services performed by competent medical
personnel.
C. Montana I
Doe v. Esch221 involved a similar conflict between Montana's
Abortion Control Act, which has a physician-only provision, and the
physician assistant regulations which provided that the practice of a
physician assistant be defined by a utilization plan determined by
215. NYCLU Brief, supra note 123, at 21 (quoting Governor's Comm'n Appointed to
Review New York State Abortion Law, Comm. Reports and Pub. Hearings Transcripts (1968),
Archives Series No. 10,996-89).
216. N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.40 (consol. 1996).
217. N.Y. PENAL LAW §125.05(3) (consol. 1996).
218. Declaratory Ruling by the N.Y. Dept. of Health, supra note 207; see also Governor's
Comm'n Appointed to Review New York State Abortion Law, Comm. Reports and Pub.
Hearings Transcripts (1968), Archives Series No. 10,996-89 (explaining that the purpose of the
physician-only provision was "to reduce substantially the number of illegal abortions and
thereby remove the risk of death and other harm inflicted by unlicensed persons, who are
usually utterly incompetent").
219. See supra Part II.
220. NYCLU Brief, supra note 123, at 22.
221. See Doe v. Esch, No. CV-93-060-GF-PGH (D. Mont. Nov. 10, 1993).
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physician assistant and physician.' 2 In Esch, Doctor James Armstrong
and Physician Assistant Susan Cahill challenged the physician-only
provision as it applied to physician assistants.m
The Montana Abortion Control Act states, "[a]n abortion may not be
performed within the state of Montana: (a) except by a licensed
physician." 4 However, the physician assistant statute provides that:
(3) [The Montana state board of medical examiners] shall approve the
utilization plan if it finds that the practice of the physician assistant-
certified [under the utilization plan] is: (a) assigned by the supervising
physician; (b) within the scope of the training, knowledge, experience,
and practice of the supervisory physician; and (c) within the scope of
the training, knowledge, education, and experience of the physician
assistant-certified. -
First trimester abortion is within the scope of Cahill's "training,
knowledge, education, and experience," and she met all of the other
criteria to satisfy the physician assistant regulations. Furthermore, the
Board of Medical Examiners interpreted the physician assistant
regulations to grant them the authority to approve Cahill's utilization
plan, which included abortionY Based on this argument, the court
redefined "physician" in the abortion statute to include physician assistant
in order to facilitate the purpose of the statute. 27  Thus, under Esch,
Cahill was able to continue to provide first trimester abortions as
provided by her utilization plan.
D. Potential Drawbacks to the State by State Approach: Montana
H
The statutory approaches outlined above depend upon a resolution of
ambiguous abortion laws which do not specifically prohibit physician
assistants from performing abortions.m Where legislation directly
excludes physician assistants from performing abortions, the exclusionary
statute will be enforced. This is best illustrated by the events which took
place in Montana after the Esch decision.
222. See id.
223. Id.
224. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109 (1995).
225. MONT. CODE ANN. § 37-20-301(3) (1995).
226. See Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561, 564 (D. Mont. 1995).
227. In Esch, the court held that "the term 'licensed physician' in [the Montana Abortion
Control Act] includes a physician assistant-ertified ... who is supervised by a licensed
physician." Esch, No. CV-93-060-GF-PGH at 2. The court issued a permanent injunction
against enforcement of the act. See id.
228. Currently, only Montana and California have such provisions. See MONT. CODE
ANN. § 50-20-109 (amended 1995); 74 Op. Cal. Atty. Gen. 101 (1991) (declining to interpret
"licensed physician" to include "physician assistant" in the abortion context).
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In 1995, two years after the Esch decision, the Montana Legislature
overrode the district court's opinion and amended the Montana Abortion
Control Act (MACA) to specifically prohibit the performance of
abortions by physician assistants. 9  The amendment to the MACA
states, "[The utilization plan of a physician assistant may not provide for
performing abortions. ""
The selective exclusion of physician assistants from performing
abortions in Montana was the result of an anti-abortion group's attempt to
decrease the number of abortion providers in Montana. 1 The Montana
Right to Life Association actively targeted abortion providers in the state,
including Cahill and her supervising physician, Doctor James
Armstrong. 232 As discussed above, pro-life activitists successfully
decreased the number of providers in the state from twenty in 1982 to
twelve in 1996. 3  Cahill was one of the twelve providers (the other
eleven were licensed physicians) who had refused to succumb to the
group's pressure and harassment.23'
The goal of the 1995 Amendment was to prevent Cahill from
performing abortions. 5 The MACA includes the following statement of
purpose:
The legislature reaffirms the tradition of the state of Montana to protect
every human life, whether unborn or aged, healthy or sick. In keeping
with this tradition and in the spirit of our constitution, we reaffirm the
intent to extend the protection of the laws of Montana in favor of all
human life.
229. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(5) (amended 1995). In Armstrong v. Mazurek,
the district court denied plaintiff's request for a preliminary injunction to stop enforcement of
the statute as amended. Armstrong v. Mazurek, 906 F. Supp. 561 (D. Mont. 1995). The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded to the district court with orders to perform a proper
balancing of hardships. See Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566 (9th Cir. 1996). The district
court still denied the plaintiffs the preliminary injunction. The State filed a petition for
certiorari with the Supreme Court and agreed to an injunction pending Supreme Court review.
Telephone Interview with Precilla Smith, Staff Attorney, Center for Reproductive Law and
Policy (Jan. 31, 1997). The Supreme Court reviewed the preliminary injunction and upheld the
district court's decision. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer stated that the Court should
not have intervened "at this preliminary stage." Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. 1865
(1997).
230. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-109(5) (amended 1995).
231. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95; see also Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Roundup,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 17, 1997, at A18.
232. See CRLP Brief, supra note 95, at 4-8.
233. See id. at 4.
234. See id. at 4-8.
235. See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102 (1995); see also Mazurek, 117 S. Ct. at 1870-71
(Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When one looks at the totality of circumstances surrounding the
legislation, there is evidence from which one could conclude that the legislature's predominant
motive.., was to make abortions more difficult.").
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It is the intent of the legislature to restrict abortion to the extent
permissible under decisions of appropriate courts or paramount
legislation2 36
Cahill and Armstrong filed a complaint, alleging that prohibiting
abortions by physician assistants posed an undue burden on a woman's
right to terminate her pregnancy.2 7 The Court held that Montana's
exclusion of physician assistants from performing abortions did not
impose an undue burden on a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy. 8  Thus, the Montana legislature was able to preempt the
statutory approach which the Esch court used to permit Cahill to perform
first trimester abortions. After the Mazurek ruling, Cahill can no longer
perform abortions, even though she had been safely performing abortions
for almost twenty years.
Physician assistants seeking to perform abortions may find relief
under statutory approaches like those in New York and in Esch in
Montana, and physician assistants may continue to provide abortions in
states such as Vermont where there are no physician-only provisions in
the states' abortion laws. However, physician assistants are the easiest
targets when anti-abortion activists seek to decrease the number of
abortion providers or eliminate access to abortion altogether, especially
after the Mazurek ruling.
V. State Constitutions and Privacy
Where state legislation specifically prohibits physician assistants
from providing abortions, one option for pro-choice advocates is to
challenge such legislation under state constitutions, some of which afford
greater protection for privacy and abortion rights than does the federal
constitution.
In the wake of Casey, abortion is no longer recognized as a
fundamental right by the Supreme Court and restrictions are subject to
the lower "undue burden" standard rather than strict scrutiny. 9
However, state constitutions can provide an alternate means for
protecting reproductive rights.2" Unlike the United States Constitution,
236. MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-102.
237. See Armstrong v. Mazurek, 94 F.3d 566, 566-67.
238. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 117 S. Ct. at 1866, 1869. This is not the end of Mazurek
v. Armstrong. The case will return to the district dourt where the court will address whether
the law is unconstitutional because it targeted Cahill personally. See Peres & Elasser, supra
note 100, at 3.
239. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
240. See Kevin Francis O'Neill, The Road Not Taken: State Constitutions as an Alternative
Source of Protection for Reproductive Rights, 11 N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 5 (1993); see
also Corns, Note, The Impact of Public Abortion Funding Decisions on Indigent Women: A
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some state constitutions expressly recognize a right of privacy.24' Other
state courts have found that state constitutions provide broader
protections than those granted by the Supreme Court even when there is
no right of privacy expressly recognized by the state constitutions. 42
Abortion funding is an example of an area where women have
achieved broader protection from state courts than from federal courts.243
Although the Supreme Court has refused to extend the right to state
funding for abortions, in many states, abortion rights advocates have
fought for and won the right to publicly funded abortions under state
constitutions.2" State courts in California, Connecticut, Idaho, Illinois,
Proposal to Reform State Statutory and Constitutional Abortion Funding Provisions, 24 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 371 (1991).
241. See, e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed."); ARIZ. CONST. art. II, § 8 ("No person shall be
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law."); CAL. CONST.
art. I, § 1 ("All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among
these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting
property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy."); FLA. CONST. art. I, §
23 ("Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free from governmental intrusion
into his private life."); HAw. CONST. art. I, § 6 ("The right of the people to privacy is
recognized and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest."); LA.
CONST. art. I, § 5 ("Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions of privacy.");
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 ("The right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a
free society and shall not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest.").
242. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 146-47 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925,
931-32 (N.J. 1982); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Dept. of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247,
1256-57 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972, 978 (N.Y. S. Ct. 1991).
243. See O'Neill, supra note 240, at 5-6.
244. In Harris and Maher, the Supreme Court held that a woman's right to terminate her
pregnancy does not extend to the right to have abortions paid for by the government. See
Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 318 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473-74 (1977). In
Maher, the Supreme Court upheld a state regulation which gave Medicaid benefits to women
seeking prenatal care but not to women seeking abortion, unless the abortion is medically
necessary. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 466, 480. In Maher, the Court stated,
The Connecticut regulation before us is different in kind from the laws invalidated in
our previous abortion decisions. The Connecticut regulation places no obstacles-
absolute or otherwise-in the pregnant woman's path to an abortion... It]he
indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for
some women to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by [the]
regulation.
Id. at 474.
Similarly, in Harris, the Court upheld the Hyde Amendment, a federal law prohibiting the
use of Medicaid money "to perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be
endangered if the fetus were carried to term; or except for such medical procedures necessary
for the victims of rape or incest." Harris, 448 U.S. at 300, 318. The Hyde Amendment
provides a maternal health exception only where the mother's life is in danger, but does not
permit the use of Medicaid funding for elective or even medically necessary abortions. See id.
at 300. The Court stated, "[The] Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the
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Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New
Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, and Wyoming have recognized
broad protections for privacy under their state constitutions, requiring
neutral funding policies for abortion and prenatal care.245  State
constitutions in at least sixteen states provide broader protection for the
right of privacy than the federal constitution.246
Montana's Constitution is an example of a state constitution which
provides greater protection for the right of privacy than the federal
constitution.247 Unlike the United States Constitution which has been
interpreted to contain an implicit right of privacy, 8 Montana's
Constitution has an explicit reference to the right of privacy.249 Article
II, Section 10 of the Montana Constitution provides: "The right of
individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall
not be infringed without the showing of a compelling state interest. " "
The Montana Supreme Court explained:
Since the right to privacy is explicit in the Declaration of Rights in
Montana's Constitution, it is a fundamental right and any legislation
regulating the exercise of a fundamental right must be reviewed under a
strict-scrutiny analysis. To withstand a strict-scrutiny analysis, the
same range of choice in deciding whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would
have had if Congress had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all." Id. at 317.
But see Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BVD-94-811 (Mont. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995); Comm.
to Defend Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Right to
Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925 (N.J. 1982); Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1991); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct.
App. 1983); Doe v. Celani, No. $81-84CnC (Vt. Chittenden City, Super. Ct. May 23, 1986).
245. See NARAL, WHO DECIDES?, supra note 147, at x; see also Comm. to Defend
Reprod. Rights v. Myers, 625 P.2d 779 (Cal. 1981); Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134 (Conn.
Super. 1986); Moe v. Secretary of Admin., 417 N.E.2d 387 (Mass. 1981); Jeannette R. v.
Ellery, No. BVD-94-811 (Mont. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d
925 (N.J. 1982); Hope v. Perales, 571 N.Y.S.2d 972 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); Planned
Parenthood Ass'n v. Dep't of Human Resources, 663 P.2d 1247 (Or. Ct. App. 1983); Doe v.
Celani, No. $81-84CnC (Vt. Chittenden City, Super. Ct. May 23, 1986).
246. State constitutions in Alaska, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Illinois,
Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Jersey, New Mexico, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Wyoming provide broader protection of the right of privacy. See NARAL, WHO
DECIDES?, supra note 147, at x.
247. See State v. Siegal, 934 P.2d 176, 183 (Mont. 1997); State v. Gryczan, 1997 Mont.
LEXIS 136, at *24 (Mont. 1997).
248. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that a Connecticut law
forbidding contraceptive use by married adults infringed upon the Constitutional right of
privacy).
249. See MONT. CONST., art. II, § 10.
250. Id.
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legislation must be justified by a compelling state interest and must be
narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest. 5
Thus, the Montana Supreme Court found that the Montana
Constitution provides citizens greater protection for their right of privacy
than the Federal Constitution. So far, Montana courts have held that the
right of privacy extends to abortion funding, 2 the privacy of medical
records, 3 and consensual sexual conduct between same sex couples, z 4
all areas which are not protected by the federal constitution.
In Jeannette R. v. Ellery, the court held that Montana's privacy
provision encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to continue
her pregnancy. 255 In addition, the court found that because of the barriers
imposed by a woman's economic situation and the shortage of abortion
providers, the abortion decision has additional implications for poor
women and women who live in rural areas. The court explained that the
right of privacy in the Montana Constitution encompasses the rights of all
women, rich or poor, to decide whether or not to bear a child.2
In Montana, the constitution itself provides the standard of review
for laws which implicate the right of privacy. 2 7 The right of privacy is a
fundamental right which requires the compelling state interest standard. 25'
Since a fundamental right is involved, the state must prove 1) the
legislation is "justified by a compelling state interest," and 2) the
legislation is "narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling
interest. ,259
While states have traditionally regulated the health and safety of
their citizens, including regulating the practice of medicine, legislation
which implicates the right of privacy under the Montana Constitution is
subject to the two part test set out in State v. Gryczan.2 ° The state must
251. Gryczan, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 136, at *27 (holding that "same-gender, consensual
sexual conduct is protected by Montana's constitutional right to privacy").
252. See Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BVD-94-811 (Mont. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995). But
see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 466, 480 (1977).
253. State v. Beandry, 941 P.2d 448 (Mont. 1997) (holding that the state constitution
expands the right of privacy beyond the traditional search and seizure protections to encompass
medical records, which traditionally have not been protected by the federal constitution).
254. See Gryczan, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 136, at *27 (finding that the Montana Constitution
protects the right of same-sex couples to engage in sexual conduct). But see Bowers v.
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (holding that the right of privacy does not protect homosexual
conduct).
255. See Jeannette R. v. Ellery, No. BVD-94-811 (Mont. Dist. Ct. May 19, 1995).
256. Id.
257. See MONT. CONST., art. II, § 10.
258. See id.
259. Gryczan, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 136, at *27.
260. See id.
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demonstrate a compelling state interest and the legislation "must be
narrowly tailored to effectuate only that compelling interest. "261
In Montana, the state claims that there are two state interests which
justify the physician-only law and the amendment prohibiting physician
assistants from performing abortions: the potential life of the fetus and
the health of the mother. Under cases which analyze the abortion
decision under strict scrutiny, a state interest in the potential life of the
fetus does not become compelling until viability, generally at the
completion of the second trimester.' Physician assistants such as Susan
Cahill do not perform abortions past the first trimester. Moreover, the
issue of fetal life remains constant whether the abortion is performed by a
physician or a midlevel provider. Thus, the interest in the potential life
of the fetus is not implicated in laws such as the Montana physician-only
requirement and the prohibition against abortions by physician assistants.
The second justification for Montana's physician-only law is the
protection of maternal health. During the 1970s, in Roe and Menillo, the
Court applied strict scrutiny to laws regulating abortion, finding that the
risk to maternal health was a compelling state interest which justified the
prohibition of nonphysician abortion providers. 2m Thus, at that time,
states could prohibit nonphysicians from performing abortions under the
Federal Constitution's strict scrutiny analysis.2' However, due to
changes in medical care and education in the United States over the last
quarter century, abortions performed by physician assistants during the
first trimester are now just as safe as abortions performed by physicians
under similar circumstances.2' During or after the second trimester,
when the abortion procedure becomes more complex and the risk of
complication increases, the state may be justified in imposing provider
restrictions which exclude physician assistants. Nonetheless, laws which
prohibit physician assistants from performing abortions during the first
trimester can no longer be justified by a compelling interest in maternal
health.
Moreover, the physician-only requirements and laws which prohibit
physician assistants from performing abortions fail the second part of the
Gryczan test because such restrictions are not "narrowly tailored to
effectuate only that compelling interest." 2' Due to the barriers a woman
261. Id.
262. See In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1192-94 (Fla. 1989) (defiming viability as "the time
at which the fetus becomes capable of meaningful life outside the woman"); see also Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
263. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 165; Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9, 11 (1975).
264. Menillo, 423 U.S. at 11.
265. See Freedman et al., supra note 64, at 553 (comparing complication rates of abortions
performed by physicians to abortions performed by physician assistants).
266. See Gryczan, 1997 Mont. LEXIS 136, at *27.
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faces when she seeks to terminate her pregnancy, such as economic
constraints, lack of abortion providers, and travel considerations, 267 a
woman who cannot find a provider may have to postpone an abortion
until the second trimester or carry the pregnancy to term, both of which
pose greater risks to maternal health than first trimester abortions
(whether performed by a physician assistant or a physician). The state
interest in maternal health is actually advanced by promoting abortions by
physician assistants and by encouraging and training physician assistants
to perform first trimester abortions.
Using the lessons learned from the abortion funding cases and other
state cases which recognize broader protection for the right of privacy
under state constitutions, pro-choice advocates could use state
constitutions as tools to legalize abortions performed by midlevel
practitioners."'
Conclusion
We are in an era where the scarcity of abortion providers is
burdening the rights of women seeking to terminate their pregnancies.
Legalizing abortions performed by midlevel providers is one solution to
the problem of access. The examples provided by Vermont, New York,
and Montana illustrate three statutory approaches which legalize abortions
performed by physician assistants.2 70  One untested avenue remains
through the use of state constitutions, which may offer greater protection
for individual rights in the privacy and abortion contexts than the federal
constitution. 27' State constitutions thus present a new approach to
legalizing abortions performed by midlevel practitioners, and can be used
as strategic complements to the statutory arguments used in Vermont,
New York, and Montana. Taken together, the statutory approaches used
in Vermont, New York, and Montana and the right of privacy cases
under individual state constitutions provide valuable tools for legalizing
abortions performed by midlevel providers and improving access to
abortion.
267. See supra Part III.
268. While the state constitution approach has yet to be pursued in this context, there are
problems with this avenue as well. With a similar result as that in Montana, the legislators
could amend the state constitution to preclude abortions by nonphysicians.
269. See supra Part III.
270. See supra Part IV.
271. See supra Part V.
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